

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION**

JERRY ANTHONY GRIFFIN,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	
VS.	:	
	:	
Warden KENNETH VAUGHN, <i>et al.</i> ,	:	NO. 7:10-CV-67 (HL)
	:	
Defendants.	:	<u>ORDER & RECOMMENDATION</u>

Plaintiff **JERRY ANTHONY GRIFFIN**, an inmate at Emmanuel Probation Detention Center in Twin City, Georgia, has filed a *pro se* civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff also seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of the \$350.00 filing fee or security therefor pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Based on plaintiff's submissions, the Court finds that plaintiff is unable to prepay the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* and waives the initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is nevertheless obligated to pay the full filing fee, as is directed later in this order and recommendation. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the business manager of Emmanuel Probation Detention Center.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner complaint "which seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." Section 1915A(b) requires a federal court to dismiss a prisoner complaint

that is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”; or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.” *Carroll v. Gross*, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and that the complaint “must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).

In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true. *Brown v. Johnson*, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” *Tannenbaum v. United States*, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state

law. *Hale v. Tallapoosa County*, 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, then the complaint is subject to dismissal. *See Chappell v. Rich*, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a § 1983 complaint because the plaintiff's factual allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation). *See also* 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the standard in § 1915A "shall" be dismissed on preliminary review).

II. STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS

Plaintiff states that he entered Southwest Probation Detention Center on March 15, 2010 and met with PA Badger who told him to fill out a "sick call" if he needed medical care. Plaintiff alleges that he filled out a sick call in which he explained that he suffered from "burning urine, blood in stool, acid reflux," and swollen, painful right knee. He also requested a shaving and bottom bunk profile. Plaintiff states that when he saw PA Badger on March 25, 2010, PA Badger would not provide medication for the "burning urine [or] blood in stool." Plaintiff spoke with Sgt. Charlie Zackery who informed him to submit a grievance.

Plaintiff states that he saw PA Badger again on March 31, 2010 because he was still experiencing the same medical problems. Plaintiff maintains that PA Badger told him that he did not trust detainees, he refused to give plaintiff any medication, and he would not examine plaintiff to determine the cause of the bloody stool. Plaintiff completed another grievance "for denial of medical treatment." Plaintiff states he spoke with Superintendent Christopher Railey about the

alleged lack of medical care at the Southwest Probation Detention Center. According to plaintiff, Mr. Railey assured him that he would speak to the main doctor at Autry State Prison about the situation. Plaintiff states that he has not heard “from Mr. Railey again about this situation.”

Plaintiff states he filled out a sick call on April 4, 2010 to see the doctor at Autry State Prison. Plaintiff alleges that he had to see PA Badger instead on April 7, April 9, and again on April 13. Plaintiff states that on April 13, 2010, he had Sgt. Zackery accompany him to see PA Badger because he wanted a “witness to show he was not lieing (sic) about . . . Badger.” Plaintiff states that PA Badger would not see how much blood was in his stool, would not check his knee, and simply told plaintiff that he would not receive any medical treatment.

Apparently, Susan Crawford responded to and denied one or all of the many grievances that plaintiff filed about PA Badger’s failure to provide medical care.

Plaintiff seeks damages, to have PA Badger “removed from his practice because of these relevant violation[s], and to “subspend (sic) [the] remain[ing] balance of [his] sentence.”

This Court has no power to remove Mr. Badger from his position at Southwest Probation Detention Center. Moreover, suspension of a prison sentence and release from jail are not remedies that are available under § 1983. *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

Plaintiff has arguably named five defendants. First, plaintiff shows Warden Kenneth Vaughn as a defendant. However he makes no allegations against this individual in the body of his complaint. A § 1983 claim must allege a causal connection between a defendant and an alleged constitutional violation. See *Zatler v. Wainwright*, 802 F.d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986). Warden

Vaughn is subject to dismissal on this ground alone.

Moreover, to any extent that plaintiff is attempting to hold Warden Vaughn responsible for the actions of his employees, it is well settled that a plaintiff cannot prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior or supervisory liability. *Rogers v. Evans*, 792 F.2d 1052 (11th Cir. 1986); *H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard*, 786 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1986). Instead the plaintiff must show that the supervisor personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or that there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. *H.C. by Hewett*, 786 F.2d at 1086-87. “The causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify supervising officials must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” *Brown v. Crawford*, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990), *cert. denied*, 500 U.S. 933 (1991).

Plaintiff does not allege that Warden Vaughn was personally involved in the alleged lack of medical care. Moreover, plaintiff’s assertions do not establish the causal connection necessary to hold this defendant responsible for the plaintiff’s alleged lack of medical care.

It is therefore **RECOMMENDED** that Warden Kenneth Vaughn be **DISMISSED** from this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the district judge to whom this case is assigned, within fourteen (14) days

after being served a copy of this order.

Plaintiff also names Sgt. Charlie Zackery as a defendant in response to question nine on the § 1983 form. However, he does not show this officer as a defendant in the heading of his complaint. Moreover, plaintiff does not allege that Sgt. Zackery violated his constitutional rights in any manner. He simply states that Sgt. Zackery told him to complete a grievance regarding PA Badger's failure to provide medical care and, on one occasion, accompanied plaintiff to PA Badger's office so that he could be a witness to the failure to provide care. To any extent that plaintiff seeks to name Sgt. Zackery as a defendant, he has simply not shown that an any act or omission on the part of Sgt. Zackery deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States. *Hale v. Tallapoosa County*, 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995)

It is therefore **RECOMMENDED** that Sgt. Charlie Zackery be **DISMISSED** from this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the district judge to whom this case is assigned, within fourteen (14) days after being served a copy of this order.

Plaintiff states that defendant Susan Crawford denied his grievance. This appears to be the only allegation against Ms. Crawford. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff has no constitutional right to participate in prison grievance procedures. *See Wildberger v. Bracknell*, 869 F.2d 1467, 1467-68 (11th Cir. 1989). Therefore, a prison official's denial of a grievance is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

It is therefore **RECOMMENDED** that Susan Crawford be **DISMISSED** from this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the district judge to whom this case is assigned, within fourteen (14) days after being served a copy of this order.

The only remaining defendants are PA Badger and Christopher Railey. At this time, the Court cannot find that plaintiff's allegations against these two defendants are frivolous. Therefore, this action shall go forward against these defendants.

It is hereby **ORDERED** that service be made against defendants Railey and Badger, and that they file a Waiver of Reply, an Answer, or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the ***Prison Litigation Reform Act.***

DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE

During the pendency of this action, all parties shall at all times keep the clerk of this court and all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of their current address. Failure to promptly advise the Clerk of any change of address may result in the dismissal of a party's pleadings filed herein.

DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION

Plaintiff is advised that he must diligently prosecute his complaint or face the possibility that it will be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. Defendants are advised that they are expected to diligently defend all allegations made against them and to file timely dispositive motions as hereinafter directed. This matter will be set down for trial when the court determines that discovery has been completed and that all motions have been disposed of or the time for filing dispositive motions has passed.

FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY AND CORRESPONDENCE

It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, and correspondence with the Clerk of court; to serve copies of all motions, pleadings, discovery, and correspondence upon opposing parties or counsel for opposing parties if they are represented; and to attach to said original motions, pleadings, and discovery filed with the Clerk a certificate of service indicating who has been served and where (i.e., at what address), when service was made, and how service was accomplished (i.e., by U.S. Mail, by personal service, etc.). The Clerk of Court will not serve or forward copies of such motions, pleadings, discovery and correspondence on behalf of the parties.

DISCOVERY

Plaintiff shall not commence discovery until an answer or dispositive motion has been filed on behalf of the defendants from whom discovery is sought by the plaintiff. The defendants shall not commence discovery until such time as an answer or dispositive motion has been filed. Once an answer or dispositive motion has been filed, the parties are authorized to seek discovery from one another as provided in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The deposition of the plaintiff, a state/county prisoner, may be taken at any time during the time period hereinafter set out provided prior arrangements are made with his custodian. **Plaintiff is hereby advised that failure to submit to a deposition may result in the dismissal of his lawsuit under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.**

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery (including depositions and interrogatories) shall be completed within 90 days of the date of filing of an answer or dispositive motion by the defendant (whichever comes first) unless an extension is otherwise granted by the court upon a showing of good cause therefor or a protective order is sought by the defendants and granted by the court. This 90-day period shall run separately as to each plaintiff and each defendant beginning on the date of filing of each defendant's answer or dispositive motion, whichever comes first. The scheduling of a trial may be advanced upon notification from the parties that no further discovery

is contemplated or that discovery has been completed prior to the deadline.

Discovery materials shall not be filed with the Clerk of Court. No party shall be required to respond to any discovery not directed to him or served upon him by the opposing counsel/party. The undersigned incorporates herein those parts of the **Local Rules** imposing the following limitations on discovery: except with written permission of the court first obtained, **INTERROGATORIES** may not exceed TWENTY-FIVE (25) to each party, **REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS** under Rule 34 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed TEN (10) requests to each party, and **REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS** under Rule 36 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed FIFTEEN (15) requests to each party. No party shall be required to respond to any such requests which exceed these limitations.

REQUESTS FOR DISMISSAL AND/OR JUDGMENT

Dismissal of this action or requests for judgment will not be considered by the court absent the filing of a separate motion therefor accompanied by a brief/memorandum of law citing supporting authorities. Dispositive motions should be filed at the earliest time possible, but in any event no later than thirty (30) days after the close of discovery unless otherwise directed by the court.

DIRECTIONS TO CUSTODIAN OF PLAINTIFF

Following the payment of the required initial partial filing fee or the waiving of the payment of same, the Warden of the institution wherein plaintiff is incarcerated, or the Sheriff of any county wherein he is held in custody, and any successor custodians, shall each month cause to be remitted to the Clerk of this court twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's account at said institution until the \$350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. In accordance with provisions of the ***Prison Litigation Reform Act***, plaintiff's custodian is hereby authorized to

forward payments from the prisoner's account to the Clerk of Court each month until the filing fee is paid in full, provided the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DIRECTED that collection of monthly payments from plaintiff's trust fund account shall continue until the entire \$350.00 has been collected, notwithstanding the dismissal of plaintiff's lawsuit or the granting of judgment against him prior to the collection of the full filing fee.

PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FILING FEE

Pursuant to provisions of the ***Prison Litigation Reform Act***, in the event plaintiff is hereafter released from the custody of the State of Georgia or any county thereof, he shall remain obligated to pay any balance due on the filing fee in this proceeding until said amount has been paid in full; plaintiff shall continue to remit monthly payments as required by the ***Prison Litigation Reform Act***. Collection from the plaintiff of any balance due on the filing fee by any means permitted by law is hereby authorized in the event plaintiff is released from custody and fails to remit payments. In addition, plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal if he has the ability to make monthly payments and fails to do so.

**ELECTION TO PROCEED BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Under Local Rule 72, all prisoner complaints filed under provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are referred to a full-time United States Magistrate Judge for this district for consideration of all pretrial matters. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) authorizes and empowers full-time magistrate judges to conduct any and all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and to order the entry of judgment in a case upon the written consent of all the parties. Whether the parties elect to proceed before a magistrate judge or retain their right to proceed before a U.S. district judge is strictly up to the parties themselves.

After the filing of responsive pleadings by the defendants, the Clerk of court is directed to provide election forms to the parties and/or to their legal counsel, if represented. Upon receipt of

the election forms, each party shall cause the same to be executed and returned to the Clerk's Office within fifteen (15) days. Counsel may execute election forms on behalf of their clients provided they have such permission from their clients. However, counsel must specify on the election forms on whose behalf the form is executed.

SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED, this 17th day of August, 2010.

S// Thomas Q. Langstaff
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Inb